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(D., MONTAUA)
For Release Weds. A.M.'s, Apr. 20, 1960

SPE2CH OF SEI&TOR MIKE MANSFIELD

~~WS 1EH TO CHINA
Suggested New Approaches

OUTER MONGOLIA AIID

Mr. President:
It has long been the policy of this government not to establish
diplomatic relations with the Chinese government at Peking.
I

And so far as

am aware, the Peking government has not indj.cated any desire to establish

diplomatic relations with this nation.

The Chinese in Peking, in short, ap-

pear to be as vredded to the continuance of the present diplomatic situation
as we are.
The question of whether or not to seek to establish diplomatic relations--to extend official recognition depends on many factors.

I presume

that this Administration has weighed these factors in the same unemotional,
objective and non-political fashion as its predecessor, and has come to the
same conclusion:

that to establish diplomatic relations with Peking is not

in our national interest.

I do not quarrel with that decision.

The Executive

Branch has custody of all the facts which go into the decision and the responsibility for the decision ultimately rests with that branch.

I must say,

however, that on the basis of such information that is public, it seems to me
that the decision of the Executive Branch, in this connection, is the correct
one.
Whether or not to establish diplomatic relations with any nation is
one question.

Whether or not to seek unofficial contacts is another.

And in

this situation, it seems to me that any avenue of contact which may help us to
understand and to act intelligently on what is one of the most formidable developments of our times--the emergence and transformation of China into a
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militant communist state, is not only not to be avoided but is to be sought out.
I assume that this is one of the major considerations which has prompted this
Administration to keep a representative talking on and off with a ChineGe Communist counterpart in Geneva and Warsaw since 1954.

I assume that this is one

of the considerations which prompts the Administration to spend public funds in
obtaining, wherever possible, information about developments within China and
in analyzing and interpreting this information.

I assume that this is one of

the considerations which inspires various departments of the Administration to
spend public funds in training employees in the Chinese language.
It seems to me that no opportunity should be lost for providing to
the people of the nation--no less than to those who conduct foreign policy-as much objective information about developments in China as can be obtained.
That information should be drawn, if it is at all possible, from the actual
source of the developments.
Since the Communists achieved military supremacy on the Chinese
mainland, American journalists have been trying to do this job of informationgathering for the American people in much the same way as the Executive Branch
does for its official purposes.

They have tapped much the same pecond-hand

sources in Hong Kong, Formosa and other places along the rim of China and
elsewhere.

They have put together a scattering of facts and rumors with the

glue of speculative interpretation.

Most American journalists recognize, I

believe, that this is an inadequate way to do their job even though it is the
best that can be done in present circumstances.
But some years ago , apparently, an opportunity existed for reporters
to get news as they would prefer to get it--first-hand in China.

That op-

portunity, which depended on the cooperation of the Exectuve Branch, was
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withheld for a time.

Many months later the Executive Branch recognized

right of the newsmen to go but the situation had changed.
C o~unists

had closed the door which, for a

mo~ent,

t~e

By then, the Chinese

opp e a~ed

to h&ve openeQ.

I do not know what it will require now to get American newsmen into
China.

I do not know whether any arrangement is even possible.

I believe now,

however, as I did when the issue first arose, that it will be greatly in the
interests of this nation if the newsmen can gain entry.

If for no other reason,

it will give the people of the United States an opportunity to check, against
t heir objective reporting, the second-hand composite picture of the cataclysmic
changes in China which trickles down to us through the sieve of speculation.
In the long-run, if our present policies with respect to China are to maintain
their validity, in this as in any other matter, they must be supported by public
attitudes arrived at through an independent evaluation of the facts.

The fail-

ure to grasp the opportunity to gain entry into China in the past, the failure
now to seek to recpen the opportunity helps our policies not at all, and serves
onl y to deny to the people of the United States the contribution which a free
pres s is intended, under the Constitution, to provide to them in the conduct of
the public business.
While the responsibility for paving the way rests within the Admini st ration, I would suggest most respectfully, that a sincere and determined.
effort be made at this time to reach some a greement with Peking for the rec iprocal exchange of newsmen.

That effort has little if anything to do with

the question of formal diplomatic relations with China.

It has much to do with

an eyes-opened rather than an eyes-closed policy on an area which carries the
most far-reaching implications for the future of the nation and the peace of
the world.
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In a similar vein, I refer to the situation in Outer Mongolia.

Merely

to mention Outer r-1ongolia in a serious vein is to invite a humorous reaction or
at best, a look of perplexity.

While it rr:.C!.y be c1.ifi'icult to grasp the relation-

shlp of a vast stretch of deserts and desolate mountains in Central Asia to
major trends in world affairs, the relationship, nevertheless, is there.

It is

there, because in those deserts and mountains, the outward pulsations of Chinese
and Russian society converge in a setting which is not, in the least, fixed or
static.
Brought into direct juxtaposition in this fashion are two great
powers, to sets of national interests and fears as well as two variations of
a shared ideology.

That is the real1ty, whatever may be the apparent uni-

versality of international communism.

How these national interests and these

ideological variations reconcile or diverse, how these fears intensify or relax on contact--these questions involving Russia and China are of the greatest
significance for the conduct of effective foreign policy.

Indeed, the im-

portance of this contact has been recognized in the mauy words which have been
written by skilled people on

~his

question, without specific reference to

Outer Mongolia.
In Outer Mongolia, however, the living drama of the convergence is
being enacted.

It has been brilliantly described by Mr. Harrison Salisbury

of the Hew York Times who visited the area last year.

If there is any need

for evidence of the extraordinary value to the people of this nation and,
indeed, to the government, of competent American journalists penetrating vhere
the government does not choose to tread, I would most respectfully submit
these articles by Mr. Salisbury.
According to Mr. Salisbury, Chinese and Russians in large numbers
are present in that borderland

Separate missions from each are at work on
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separate undertakings.

Each acknowledges, formally, the national independence

of the Mongolian people but each seeks to influence the orientation and develop~ent

of the Mongols in its own fashion.

The picture which emerges from

I~.

Salisbury's articles is by no means one of a monolithic, single-minded communist super-state extending from Eastern Europe to Peking.
He have chosen in official policy--under both Democratic and Republican Administrations --not to be first-hand witnesses to the drama in Outer
Mongolia.

We have chosen, apparently, to exclude ourselves from the legitimate

and continuing observations which would be possible in Outer Mongolia, if official contact were maintained with that country, observations which would be
extremely helpful in the formulation of effective policies with regard to all
of Asia as well as Russia.
So far as I am aware we have not explored the possibilities of some
kind of formal ties with the Mongolian government at Ulan Bator.

That is the

case although the arguments against recognition of Peking do not apply in this
situation and there are indications that the Mongolian government, which is
recognized by certain Asian countries, is anxious to establish contact with
Western states.

Further, we have frowned upon the admission of Outer Mongolia

to the United Nations.

We apparently have marked it, and perhaps in error, as

just another Soviet province.

In short, we may well be imprisoning our policies

in an unnecessary separation of ourselves from a most valuable source of information and official contact in the heart of Asia, out of inadequate facts, inertia
or a fear of derision.
The decision to act in the case of Outer Mongolia, as in the case of
a reciprocal exchange of newsmen with the Chinese mainland is one which rests
with the Administration.

I suggest, however, that we stand to gain by an
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initiative in this remote and little-known but highly significant area.
yet to see any persuasive reason why we should not offer to exchange

I have

explorat~ry

missions •ri th the Outer Mongolian gover-:1llle:J.t with a view to considering the
establishment of diplomatic or other ties.

Further , I believe this government

should propose in the United Nations that the Outer Mongolian government, if it
still desires admission to that organization, should exchange missions with the
Secretary-General of the U.N.

If the Secretary-General finds a reasonable basis

--comparable to some of the other admissions with which that organization has
been able to live--if he finds a reasonable basis for the admission of Outer
Mongolia then the United States should not stand in the way.

